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JOHN A. FOLK-WILLIAMS
The Use of Negotiated Agreements
to Resolve Water Disputes
Involving Indian Rights
INTRODUCTION
Disputes about the nature of Indian rights in water resources are
widespread throughout the western United States. Studies in 1982 and
1984 enumerated more than fifty cases in fourteen western states in which
a wide variety of issues were in litigation.' These issues include the
quantification of Indian rights to both surface and groundwater, jurisdic-
tion over the administration of rights, water pollution originating off-
reservation and affecting Indian water use, fishing rights, damages to
tribes from non-Indian diversions of water subject to Indian claims and
many other problems.' Because of the typical length, cost and polarization
surrounding water rights litigation involving Indian rights, several efforts
to resolve these cases through the use of negotiation have been made.
Attempts to negotiate solutions to controversies relating to American
Indian water rights and resource management encounter a number of
problems that have made difficult the common use of negotiated settle-
ment. First, these cases involve a resource which is vested with great
symbolic and cultural as well as economic importance. Several studies
have documented the extent to which water is regarded as different from
other natural resources,3 one that represents for many water users the
!. J. FOLK-WILLIAMS, WHAT INDIAN WATER MEANS TO THE WEST (1982), and L. Burton, American
Indian Water Rights in the Western United States (1984) (doctoral dissertation).
2. Several cases bear upon Indian water rights without dealing explicitly with water rights,
including Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981) and Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v.
Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (1982), 9th Cir. cert. den., 459 U.S. 977 (1982) (regarding ownership of
beds of navigable watercourses) U.S. v. Washington-Phase II, 694 F.2d 1374 9th Cir. vacated 759
F.2d 1353 (regarding Indian right to environmental protection of fishery habitat); and Holly v. Totus
655 F. Supp. 548 (E.D.Wash. 1983) affd 812 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1987) (regarding tribal right to
regulate non-Indian users of surplus water on and off-reservation). Regarding Indian rights to water
of high quality, see Treuer, An Indian Right to Water Undiminished in Quality, HAMLINE L. REV.
347-68 and H. Ranquist, What Color the Water: Does the Indians' Reserved Water Right Include
Protection of Water Quality?, speech prepared for the 7th Annual Conference on contemporary
American Indian Issues, UCLA. For a discussion of development of Indian water rights to hydropower
siting, see DuBey and Schlosser, Indian Resources and Hydropower Development, Symposium on
Small Hydropower and Fisheries, American Fisheries Society (1985). The relationship of Indian
reserved rights and a U.S. Forest Management plan is discussed in Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association v. Peterson 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983), modified, 795 F.2d 688 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 1971 (1987).
3. Kelso, The Water is Different Syndrome or What is Wrong with the Water Industry, Proceedings
of the Third Annual Conference of the American Water Works Association, Urbana, Illinois (1967);
A. MAAS AND R. ANDERSON, AND THE DESERT SHALL REJOICE (1978); F. BROWN & H. INGRAM, WATER
AND POVERTY IN THE SouTHwEsT (1985).
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very basis of community existence. Consequently, it is often difficult or
impossible for community leaders to appear to be bargaining about what
is seen not as a commodity but almost as a fundamental value.
Second, these disputes regularly involve at least three levels of gov-
ernment (state, federal and Indian) and take place in a context of dispute
over the relative limits of the authority of each level in relation to the
others. Third, where they are linked to comprehensive adjudication pro-
cesses, they may engage the interests of tens of thousands of individual
water rights holders, creating serious problems of representation in a
negotiation process. Fourth, Indian tribes, and in some circumstances
states and the federal government, assert rights in two roles simultane-
ously. They are at once proprietary owners of valuable property rights
and governments asserting jurisdictional authority over the administration
and management of water sources. These two roles are usually inter-
twined, yet each gives rise to a separate set of problems that may require
different forms of agreement.
A fifth problem is scarcity of supply. A 1984 study4 prepared by the
Western States Water Council for the Western Governors Association
attempted to quantify the scope of Indian claims to water. While rec-
ognizing that there was little uniformity regarding either methods of
quantification or consistency of studies made from state to state, the study
nevertheless indicated that the potential claims of the tribes in fifteen
states accounted for a significant fraction, sometimes more than the total
available, of the unused water resources in each state.' According to the
Water Resources Council, water use in the West ranges from 62 to 304
percent of available surface supplies in average years and is at or above
available supply in dry years.6 Disputes about Indian water rights, there-
fore, not only determine whether available supplies of unappropriated
water will be under Indian or non-Indian control but also may require
the re-allocation of water from existing non-Indian to Indian uses.
Despite the complexity of these cases, there are several negotiation
processes underway in the western states and a few examples of ratified
agreements now in various stages of implementation. 7 Arizona has been
the scene of two negotiated agreements in the past decade, and Montana
has recently concluded a compact with the Fort Peck Tribes while con-
4. WESTERN GOVERNOR'S POLICY OFFICE, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST (1984) [hereinafter
INDIAN WATER RIGHTS].
5. id. at 94-95.
6. 3 U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES (1975).
7. On July 14, 1982 the Secretary of the Interior announced a federal policy of seeking negotiated
settlements in Indian water rights cases. Interior formed a Federal Water Policy Advisory Group to
work on negotiating settlements. The Western Regional Council and The Western Governors' Policy
office developed positions supporting the use of negotiation in 1982-83.
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tinuing to negotiate with several other tribes in the state. Utah negotiated
a compact with the Ute Tribe in 1980 that expanded the scope of a 1965
agreement, but it has not been ratified by the Indian community. Recently,
the two Ute tribes in Colorado concluded an agreement to resolve water
rights issues with the state and non-Indian water users, but this has not
been adopted as yet as a congressional enactment. Similarly, a major
dispute in California has been resolved through negotiation at the local
level, but the agreement awaits congressional ratification.
According to an official of the Department of the Interior, six nego-
tiation efforts were formally underway in March 1987, and several others
were under consideration. These include negotiations in Idaho, New Mex-
ico, Nevada, Arizona and Montana.
These cases are numerous enough to permit review of common ele-
ments. Since few agreements have been reached and none fully imple-
mented, this article will not presume to draw conclusions on the basis of
this experience but rather to summarize key problems and offer sugges-
tions about negotiation process that might be helpful to parties considering
or engaged in negotiating Indian water cases.
The article also emphasizes that each case must be examined indepen-
dently before a judgment is reached on whether or not negotiation can
be used successfully. Ultimately, the fact that all these cases involve
Indian water rights is less important than the objectives of the specific
parties in each situation. Faced with similar problems but different objec-
tives and circumstances, comparable parties in different states could well
make opposite choices about the feasibility and desirability of using a
negotiation strategy.
INDIAN AND NON-INDIAN RIGHTS TO WATER: CAUSE OF
CONFLICT AND APPROACHES TO DECISIONMAKING
Most conflict about natural resources originates in efforts to put resources
to new uses or to change some aspect of the way in which resources are
controlled. In either case, there is a perception that existing uses of the
resource in question are threatened. In the case of water, that perception
can also arouse feelings that cultural values and community existence are
also threatened. Where Indians and non-Indians clash on the issue of
access to water, basic values and legal principles on both sides are set
forth in sharp relief.
Indian governments have approached the subject of water resources
with attitudes paralleling those of the treaty era of the past century.
Numerous Indian leaders have expressed the view that questions about
water rights relate to the survival of the tribes both economically and
culturally, just as questions about the reservation of lands by treaty in
Winter 19881
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earlier times had a decisive effect on the ability of the tribes to continue
their existence and their cultural identity!8
In the view of many tribal leaders, water rights were vested at the time
treaties were concluded or relate back to aboriginal water use.9 The prob-
lem from this point of view is not to establish and define the fights but
simply to have them recognized and accepted by the non-Indian world.
The Supreme Court has directly addressed the substance of Indian water
rights in only two decisions, but these cases are crucial to the current
disputes about the subject.
The first case, Winters v. United States, '0 held that the federal govern-
ment reserved water when it set aside land from the public domain for
use by the Indians. By implication, the reservation of land required a
water right sufficient to fulfill the purposes for which the reservation had
been created. These rights could not be lost by non-use, could expand
over time if new uses demanded additional water and had priority as of
the date on which the reservation was created. The first two of these
elements contrast sharply with state water rights law, based on the prior
appropriation doctrine. This doctrine recognizes rights to water use based
on continued application of measured quantities of water to specific ben-
eficial use. If the use is discontinued, the right is subject to forfeiture,
and any expansion of the water right is possible only through a new
application and creation of a separate right at a later period in time."
The third element of the Winters right, the priority date, enables Indian
reserved rights to be consistent with the state systems to some extent.
State water law of prior appropriation uses the principle of first in time
is first in right. In other words, those users who established their rights
first have the prior right to use supplies in times of scarcity. When there
is insufficient water, the prior appropriation doctrine requires that the
more junior rights holders are removed from the distribution list until all
senior rights are satisfied. This aspect of the system is designed to provide
as much security as possible to rights holders, based on their order in the
priority list. Because most, but by no means all, Indian reservations were
created before significant non-Indian settlement and water use, the reserved
rights doctrine establishes the seniority of most Indian rights over most
non-Indian rights. However, the fact that Indian water use can expand
over time but still command the early priority date associated with the
8. THE AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., INDIAN WATER POLICY IN A CHANGING
ENVIRONMENT, 56-58, 68-73 (1982).
9. See Merrill, Aboriginal Water Rights, 20 NAT. RES. J. 45-70 (1980).
10. 207 U.S. 564 (1980).
II. 5 F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAWS, 21-38, 104-130 (Nat'l Water
Comm'n 1971).
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creation of the reservation makes it difficult for non-Indian rights holders
to know if their supplies are secure or not.' 2
The existence of these parallel but conflicting methods for establishing
water rights, one for Indians under federal law and one for non-Indians
under state law, has had the effect of creating simultaneous Indian and
non-Indian claims to the same bodies of water. This was possible because
most Indian rights were never quantified or put to use and because states
allowed non-Indians to establish appropriative rights to waters that could
be subject to Indian claims. Consequently in recent decades, Indians have
asserted claims to waters already put to use by others. Under federal law
their rights were created at the time their reservations were established
but have rarely been quantified. The state and Indian rights are both valid,
but the Indian rights, if now put to use, could displace any non-Indian
water users with priority dates junior to those of the Indians. The key
question raised by the Winters Doctrine is how one goes about quantifying
an established but unused right. This question was addressed in the second
major Supreme Court case on the issue.
That case, Arizona v. California,3 extended the Winters Doctrine to
all federal reservations and also adopted a standard for quantification of
the reserved rights of certain tribes on the mainstem of the lower Colorado
River. That standard related to the amount of practicably irrigable acreage
that existed on each reservation. The idea behind this standard was that
it represented a way to remove the uncertainty about the possible expan-
sion of Indian rights over time by relating future use to a number that
could be determined in an adjudication process, a number moreover that
was based on the purposes of the reservation as well as the amount of
land set aside for Indian use.
The practicably irrigable acreage standard has been used widely in
estimating the potential extent of Indian claims, but it is a standard that
may have limited relevance to many reservations. Under the Supreme
Court's decision in U.S. v. New Mexico, 4 a case involving federal reserved
rights to waters within a national forest, the court indicated that the
controlling factor in quantification was the primary use for which the
reservation of land had been made. Several Indian reservations were set
aside to protect hunting and fishing areas rather than for agriculture, and
recent lower court decisions have recognized Indian water rights for this
purpose. The key issue in utilizing a standard for quantification is deter-
mining the purpose for which the reservation was created. That may be
12. INDIAN WATER RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 121-24.
13. 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
14. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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agriculture or hunting and fishing or the maintenance of a permanent
homeland or a combination of these and other goals. 5
Numerous issues stemming from the major Winters decisions have
been in litigation for the past three decades. States have been declared
to have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts in the adjudication of
reserved rights and, if the states have initiated comprehensive stream
adjudication processes, are generally to be deferred to by the federal
courts. 6 Among the many unresolved issues about Indian water rights
are: the applicability of the Winters Doctrine to groundwater, the ability
of Indians to use or lease their water off-reservation, the precise standards
for quantification, including the applicability of economic feasibility cri-
teria under the practicably irrigable acreage method, the extent of Indian
and state jurisdiction regarding non-Indian water use on reservation lands,
the status of water rights owned originally by individual Indian property
owners and later transferred to non-Indians and the existence of an envi-
ronmental protection right to assure water quality for Indian water use.'"
State and private non-Indian representatives have often characterized
the Winters Doctrine as an aberration from another line of Supreme Court
cases and congressional enactments which defer to the states' authority
to create systems of water rights and administration.' The states are
concerned that Indian jurisdiction over and ownership of water rights will
fragment efforts at comprehensive planning, management and conser-
vation of water resources. They consequently seek pre-eminence in
administration as well as the adjudication of rights. They also want to
protect existing non-Indian uses of water from diminishment by virtue
of Indian claims and to preserve as much control as possible over unal-
located waters within their boundaries. 9
The federal government has played a crucial but ambiguous role. In
addition to its charge of protecting Indian water rights, it also has respon-
sibilities to store and deliver water to numerous non-Indian irrigation and
conservancy districts as well as to other federal reservations, such as
wildlife refuges, the needs of which may conflict with the rights of the
tribes. In the past, federal interests in resolving Indian water disputes
have often related to the desire to remove constraints on the construction
of congressionally authorized reclamation projects.
Indian and state interests, however, have seen federal actions or inac-
15. For a discussion of such issues, see Collins, The Future Course of the Winters Doctrine, 56
U. CoO. L. REV. 481 (1985).
16. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 103 S. Ct. 3201 (1983).
17. See generally Collins, supra note 15.
18. Bell, A State Perspective, STATE LEGISLATURES 21 (1982).
19. INDIAN WATER RIGTrs, supra note 4, at 121-24; & Thorson, Resolving Conflicts through
Intergovernrmental Agreements: The Pros and Cons of NegotiatedAgreements, at 6-7, INDIAN WATER
1985 (Miklas & Shupe ed.) (1986).
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tions as largely responsible for current conflict and argue that the federal
government should bear most or all of the cost for resolving these disputes.
The federal government has indicated that while it may have responsibility
for having encouraged non-Indian uses of water susceptible to Indian
claims, it will not accept sole financial responsibility now for correcting
those problems. It has a major interest in limiting the overall federal
liability to tribes for damages arising from its failure to deliver water
supplies promised under negotiated settlements and to insure that local
non-Indian parties and states as well as the federal government share the
costs of such settlements.20
Private non-Indian interest groups are quite diverse. Some are water
users whose state-created rights to water are jeopardized by the assertion
of Indian claims. They may face potential property and investment losses
if Indians are successful and, in some cases, find title companies unwilling
to insure water rights subject to challenge in litigation. These water rights
holders form an important political constituency pressuring elected leaders
to resolve the issues for the sake of economic expediency. Often, these
are agricultural communities with their own cultural traditions and life
styles which are threatened should water be lost to Indian use. In addition
to'economic motivation, then, they often have cultural values at stake in
water disputes.
This convergence of conflicting theories, rights and responsibilities of
the Indian, state, federal and non-Indian water user perspectives has made
resolution of questions about Indian water rights by negotiation extremely
difficult. Yet there has been widespread criticism of the alternatives. The
typical stream adjudication law suit can take decades to complete, leave
in an uncertain state for that time the legal title to water of thousands of
claimants, cost millions of dollars for all parties, polarize communities
and leave unanswered all but the issues of bare title to water rights. 2'
Another problem cited with adjudication grows out of judicial standards
used to quantify Indian rights and to decide major cases. The use of the
practicably irrigable acreage standard encourages the tribes to state max-
imum claims at the outset, and the "principle of finality" discerned by
the Supreme Court in a late phase of Arizona v. California as well as the
doctrine of resjudicata make it difficult for tribes to re-open decrees once
they have been issued. Their claims must be fully stated the first time
they are presented in court. 22
20. News release from Department of Interior (July 14, 1982).
21. See C. Marseille, Conflict Management: Negotiating Indian Water Rights, Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy and Western Legislative Conference (1983), and statements of James Bush in SENATE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., INDIAN RESERVED WATER
RiGrs 280 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter RESERVED WATER RIGhTS].
22. Ranquist, supra note 2, at 2.
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Several criticisms of negotiation have also been made. Some have
observed that the problem can be solved with enough money and enough
water, but where both are in short supply there is little likelihood that
negotiated solutions can be found. 3 Some tribes have seen negotiation
as a policy of the Interior Department intended to compromise Indian
water rights or, where negotiation is related to the state adjudication
process, as a way of bringing tribes under state jurisdiction. 4 Some claim
the fact that Indian rights are already vested, if not yet quantified, makes
it unconstitutional for the trustee of the tribes to agree to any settlement
which reduces the Indian entitlement below that achievable through the
Winters Doctrine.
Whatever the difficulty in either the adjudication or negotiation process,
the self-interest of the parties is the ultimate arbiter of which procedural
path will be utilized. The question is not always presented as a simple
choice between two methods. The following section reviews some of the
key issues surrounding the appropriate use of a negotiation strategy.
CHOOSING THE NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
Negotiation is not an end in itself but simply a means for achieving
the goals of parties in conflict. Each side must have a strategy of which
negotiation is one element. Having a strategy means having clear goals
as to what is desired.25
Strategies to secure rights to the use of water can use many options:
litigation, inter-governmental compacts, legislation, and contracts are
four of the most important. Each of these can and has involved negoti-
ation. Each can accomplish a somewhat different aim, and the exact
vehicle used will depend on the specific goals of the parties. For example,
litigation may be initiated to obtain a declaration of priorities and rights
in order to remove doubt about the nature of entitlements to specific water
sources. This is especially important if there are elements of law that
have not been clearly established and if clarification of these legal prin-
ciples is a major goal of one or more of the parties. It is, of course,
possible that the litigation process can be shortened through negotiation
of a stipulation.
A contract could be the vehicle if the parties are not concerned about
resolving once and for all the questions of legal entitlement but simply
want to reach an agreement about a specific water supply problem. Leg-
islation might be important if the parties need additional funding sources
23. RESERVED WATER RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 144.
24. Id. at 211-17.
25. Crowfoot, Negotiations: An Effective Tool for Citizen Organization?, in NEGOTIATIONS FOR
PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS 37-42 (Northern Rockies Action Group, 1980).
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to meet their goals or new legal authorities. Compacts may be used to
resolve permanently a range of jurisdictional as well as quantification
problems among different levels of government.
Whatever the route one takes to arrive at a strategic decision to use
negotiation, this choice depends on the perception and the evaluation of
costs and benefits in relation to specific goals made by each party. It is
necessary that a thorough evaluation take place. Any side which has not
done such a careful assessment of specific goals and the costs and benefits
of various strategies for achieving them should probably postpone involve-
ment in a negotiation process.
The right to negotiate has to be won by establishing the fact that the
parties cannot ignore each other. Often the necessary precursor to nego-
tiation is a litigation strategy aimed at winning recognition of the power
of one or more parties. Such recognition may occur only after prolonged
litigation in which it becomes clear that the costs of continuing to fight
in court are greater than the costs of seeking a negotiated solution. All
must recognize one another's power to influence the course of decision-
making before they will take each other seriously as negotiating partners.26
-If it has been determined that a negotiation strategy is in the best interest
of the parties, it is important to distinguish among the possible vehicles
that can be used for dispute settlement. Differing circumstances and goals
will suggest different vehicles.
One can think of settlements as falling into two major categories: 1)
where the problem is to address a specific water use issue, and the parties
confront each other as competing or potentially competing water users;
and 2) where two or more jurisdictions confront each other with conflicting
views of the limits of their authority over water, without reference to its
immediate uses. The first category relates to the tribal, state or federal
parties as proprietary owners of rights and water users and the second to
their role as governments. These two are often intertwined but it is impor-
tant to keep them conceptually distinct.
There are several forms that negotiated agreements can take: Compact,
negotiated adjudication decree, stipulated decree in non-adjudication law-
suit, contract, legislative compromise, agreement of advisory nature. It
is crucial to bear in mind that certain vehicles are designed to deal with
special circumstances.
A compact, in the context of water resources, is an inter-governmental
agreement that reserves water for the exclusive use of one jurisdiction
free of challenges by potentially competing jurisdictions.26 Often the
private water user has nothing to do with the negotiation of such a doc-
26. Cormick, The Theory and Practice of Environmental Mediation, 2 ENVTL. PROF. 27-28 (1980).
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ument. Its aim in the context of Indian water rights is comparable to that
of an interstate compact: to resolve jurisdictional disputes about who
controls the creation of rights to water use for given volumes of water
from sources that cross jurisdictional boundaries. In Indian cases, the
compact can also serve the function of specifying the sources, time limits,
points of diversion and uses of water by tribes in their role as proprietary
owners of water rights. Virtually any other issue that is in dispute between
the federal, state, and Indian levels of government can also be decided,
though to date compacts have primarily been tools for defining Indian
and state rights and relationships.
Contrasted with compacts are agreements that resolve a narrower range
of disputes between an Indian community and other water users. For
example, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe settled a water pollution lawsuit
against the cities of Reno and Sparks and the Environmental Protection
Agency with a stipulated agreement under which the cities agreed to
adopt water conservation measures.27 The Gila River Pima Maricopa
Indian Community and the Kennecott Copper Corporation resolved a
dispute over water rights used by the corporation through a contractual
agreement without reference to the rights of other water users in the
stream system.2" Many specific agreements like these are possible that
would have no effect on the many unresolved issues about water rights
and management.
It should not be assumed, then, that each dispute involving an Indian
tribe requires any particular form of agreement. Each situation must be
evaluated in relation to the specific goals to be achieved.
Some of the key procedural aspects of negotiation follow from a simple
definition. Negotiation is a voluntary decisionmaking process in which
the parties bargain directly, though not necessarily face to face, to reach
an agreement that is capable of implementation.29 This process can be
assisted by a neutral party who is sufficiently trusted by the disputants to
manage or facilitate the process but who has no power to impose a
settlement. Professionally assisted negotiation is also called mediation.
Voluntary
As a voluntary process, negotiation must be attractive to each party,
that is, each must see the prospect of specific gains that could not be
achieved in a less costly fashion through some other process. A common
27. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Reno Sparks, No. CV-LV-82-389 (D. Nev.) (Nov.
1984),
28. Water Rights Settlement and Exchange Agreement, Gila River Indian Community. Kennecott
Copper Corp.-United States of America (private document, not publicly available, Jan. 1977).
29. Cormick, supra note 26, at 27.
[Vol. 28
NEGOTIATED INDIAN WATER DISPUTES
barrier to the initiation of negotiations is the perception by one side that
the other(s) has nothing to offer or that its own interests would be impaired
by concessions the other side might demand. If one party coerces another
to a negotiating table or attempts to keep it there by coercion, the prospects
for a viable agreement or long-term contract are not enhanced. Each party
must feel free to abandon the process before final agreement if it believes
its rights are jeopardized in some way.
Bargain
The parties must be ready and willing to make concessions to one
another. If there is no room for give and take, there can be no negotiation.
Yet bargaining does not necessarily mean that the parties must take some
fraction of what they have defined as their goal. It requires that the parties
be flexible and creative in finding elements that will satisfy one another's
needs without compromising basic values. All sides must perceive that
gains are possible. One side cannot enter the process expecting only to
give or receive concessions without reciprocal offers. 30
Parties
To achieve an agreement, one must take care to identify all the parties
who have power to affect the outcome of the process. The parties to a
lawsuit may not always comprise the full group of parties in this sense.
Other groups may believe they have important interests engaged by the
prospect of a negotiated settlement. If they are excluded, they may well
challenge the agreement in court." Downstream states may balk at an
agreement reached between a tribe and an upstream state if it affects
access to water throughout a basin. Environmental groups may fight a
water project that seems like the perfect solution to a water dispute
involving a tribe and non-Indian agricultural water users. Careful deci-
sions must be made about the representation of affected parties so that
all are satisfied that their interests will be accurately stated and fully
protected during the process. And each negotiator or negotiating team
must have clear authority to speak on behalf of its constituents.3
Reach an Agreement
The parties must understand that they are aiming at a legally binding
contract or agreement in written form which they must sign. The nego-
30. J, MCCARTHY, NEGOTIATING SETTLEMENTS 26-29 (1985).
31. Susskind, Richardson & Hildebrand, Resolving Environmental Disputes, Environmental Impact
Assessment Project, Mass. Inst. of Technology 26-29 (1978); & J. MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at
18-20.
32. W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 173-76 (1971).
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tiators must either have the power to take such a step or fully disclose
to other parties the ratification steps that will follow negotiations. Since
the agreement of all parties is essential, consensus is the rule of deci-
sionmaking. Consensus protects the rights of all participants and assures
that none will be forced into an agreement simply by majority rule and
that rights of recourse to other processes will not be foreclosed until the
commitment to the agreement is made.3 Of course, the parties may not
reach consensus on all points but must be sure that those issues touching
on the viability of the agreement have been settled.
Capable of Implementation
The goal of negotiation is not simply to get all parties to sign on the
dotted line. It is to implement a solution that is defined in an agreement.
Therefore the potential problems of implementation should be addressed
during the negotiation process. The legality of measures agreed to, sources
of funding, political ratification processes, identification of agencies
responsible for carrying out the terms of the agreement and, in a. water
case, specification of the sources and availability of water must all be
considered if future problems and related disputes are not to haunt the
settlement. 4
Finally, the definition implies that the process must be planned carefully
beforehand. Precise ground rules should be adopted by the parties, and
the issues of location, process management and the press should be explic-
itly dealt with.
Every time an agreement is negotiated among the different parties each
side must in turn develop its own internal agreement. 5 The failure to do
this is the most common reason such negotiations have failed (setting
aside those cases where discussions never reached the stage of true nego-
tiations). If one or both sides never develops internal consensus on nego-
tiating positions, goals and expected outcomes, it is unlikely that the
negotiators will have the authority to proceed or, if they do conclude a
tentative agreement, that it will ever be ratified. Therefore, those con-
sidering use of this strategy must give as much attention to building
consensus within their own groups as to exploring the negotiable and
non-negotiable issues with the other side.
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS
This section summarizes a number of cases in which agreements have
33. Hater, Negotiating Regulations, 71 GEo. L.J. 92-97 (1982) is an excellent discussion of
consensus. See also Gusman and Harter, Mediated Solutions to Environmental Risks, 7 ANN. REv.
PUB. HEALTh 293-312 (1986).
34. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at 62-70.
35. Dunlap, The NegotiationsAlternative in Dispute Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1430-33 (1983-
84).
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been concluded, although not always ratified and implemented. Sum-
maries of the completed agreements highlight: 1) factors inducing the
parties to negotiate, 2) the specific benefits sought, and 3) the nature of
the agreement reached. The section following this summary examines
some of the common elements, legal problems and conditions that helped
or hindered successful use of negotiation strategies.
Navajo Nation
Upper Basin Portion of Colorado River in Arizona
In 1968, the Navajo Nation negotiated an agreement to permit use of
mainstem Colorado River water for a major coal-fired power plant to be
located on reservation land but operated by a non-Indian company. The
tribe was interested in obtaining the economic benefits from having the
plant located on the reservation, and availability of water was a critical
factor in the negotiations.'
The power of the tribe stemmed from the fact that it had Winters rights
claims to most of the water in the upper basin portion of the Colorado
River in Arizona. Under the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, Ari-
zona was allocated 50,000 acre-feet of water in the upper basin, yet most
of the land within that portion of the basin was located on the Navajo
Reservation. Virtually all existing water use in that area was confined to
Navajo lands. Any claims by the Navajo Nation to upper basin Colorado
River waters could conflict with Arizona's entitlement and could jeop-
ardize water availability for the power project. It was therefore essential
for the non-Indian parties to reach an agreement about water with the
tribe.
The tribe was interested in obtaining a number of benefits. These
included Navajo preference in employment in construction and operation
of the plant and the associated coal mining project, use of Navajo coal
in the power plant, location of the plant on lands leased from the tribe,
the availability of electricity to the tribal utility, a share for the tribe of
water imported in the future into the upper basin and other benefits.37
The tribe obtained most of its objectives in return for a pledge not to
make demands on the 50,000 acre-feet of water allocated to Arizona by
the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact exceeding the 50,000 acre-feet
allocation and to reserve for use of the power plant 34,100 acre-feet of
that amount. The limitation on Navajo claims to Colorado River water
in the upper basin within Arizona was to last the life of the power plant
or fifty years, whichever occurred first. This agreement was embodied in
36. Price and Weatherford, Indian Water Rights in Theory and Practice: Navajo Experience in
the Colorado River Basin. 40 LAW & CONTEMp. PRODS., at 97-131 (Winter 1976).
37. Problems of Electrical Power Production in the Southwest, Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs. 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. 1755-69, 1773-90 (1971).
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a Navajo tribal council resolution" and also reflected in a lease and right
of way granted by the Navajo Nation. 9 A Bureau of Reclamation water
service delivery contract was executed, and state legislation approved the
appropriation for the power plant. In 1969 the tribal council passed a
second resolution (CJW-50-69) amending the earlier one by adding a
provision that the agreement regarding the 50,000 acre-feet did not con-
stitute a waiver or relinquishment of the present or prospective water
rights of the Navajo Tribe.'
This agreement was clearly of limited purpose and did not address a
wide range of issues regarding administration of water rights or the general
water rights of the tribe. There was no quantification of the tribal right
at all but simply a dedication of waters that could be claimed by the tribe
to a specific purpose and a temporary limitation of claims the tribe might
make to waters of one segment of the Colorado River flowing through
the Navajo Reservation.
San Juan River in New Mexico
The Navajos negotiated an agreement in 1962 regarding waters allo-
cated to New Mexico under the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact.
The state was attempting to secure passage of a bill authorizing construc-
tion of the San Juan Chama Diversion Project, a transbasin facility that
would enable New Mexico to use its Colorado River water in the Rio
Grande basin, where its major cities and irrigation districts are located.
The Navajos were seeking an irrigation project to use water in the San
Juan basin and were in a position, through Winters Doctrine claims, to
block for many years access by the state to waters of the San Juan River."
Negotiations were necessary not only to permit the diversion of specific
quantities of water for Indian and non-Indian use but also to resolve a
question about the sharing of water during times of shortage. Because of
the early date of establishment of the original Navajo reservation in New
Mexico, Navajo rights would have priority over non-Indian rights, and
New Mexico felt this would jeopardize the viability of the San Juan
Chama Project.
An agreement was reached and incorporated in a federal statute42 which
authorized construction of both the San Juan Chama Diversion and the
38. Navajo Tribal General Resolution No. CD- 108-68 (Dec. 11, 1968).
39. Navajo Tribal General Resolution No. ACS-213-69 (Sept. 4, 1969).
40. For a discussion of the legal effect of these resolutions and the legal documents surrounding
the water rights issue see Back and Taylor, Navajo Water Rights: Pulling the Plug on the Colorado
River? 20 NAT. REs. J. 86-89 (1980). For a discussion of the bargaining process see Price and
Weatherford, supra, note 36, at 109-19.
41. See Price and Weatherford, supra note 36, at 120-22.
42. 43 U.S.C.A. §§615ii-yy, 620-620f (Supp. 1979).
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Navajo Indian Irrigation Project. The legislation quantified the waters to
be diverted for the non-Indians under San Juan Chama (as well as for
some projects for Pueblo Indians in the Rio Grande basin) and authorized
the diversion of 508,000 acre-feet of water per year for the Navajo Indian
Irrigation Project (NIIP). The act also incorporated a Navajo agreement
to qualify the priority of the Winters rights by sharing shortages between
the San Juan Chama Diversion Project and the Navajo lIdian Irrigation
Project proportionate to their respective diversion requirements. The leg-
islation said nothing about waiving Winters claims in the future.
The Bureau of Reclamation, charged with building the NIIP facilities,
later determined that a more efficient irrigation system than originally
planned needed a diversion of only 370,000 acre-feet instead of the
508,000. Since then there has been continuing controversy between the
tribe, the Bureau, and the state over whether the tribe can divert more
than 370,000 acre-feet, whether the NIIP water can be used for other
purposes than agriculture, and at what level the consumptive use for the
tribe should be set.43 The tribe is now in adjudication in state court over
Winters Doctrine rights to the San Juan River, and some of these issues
may be settled in the context of that suit.
Both the Navajo agreements succeeded in bringing specific economic
benefits to the tribe but did not finally resolve water rights issues.
Ak-Chin Indian Community
Ak-Chin, located thirty miles south of Phoenix, operated a successful
farming project for some time using groundwater supplies. As ground-
water pumping by surrounding non-Indian farms steadily lowered the
water table and consequently reduced the acreage that could be farmed
on the reservation, the Indian community threatened litigation on water
rights. The tribe resolved on a strategy of negotiation instead and worked
out an agreement with the Department of the Interior, later embodied in
legislation," that both settled the water rights claims of the tribe and
created a mechanism to pay for a water delivery system to the reservation.
The legislation of 1978 provided that: the Secretary of the Interior
deliver to the Ak-Chin Indian Community a permanent water supply of
85,000 acre-feet within twenty-five years; the Secretary deliver an interim
supply of water until the permanent supply is available; the tribe could
take action against the United States for failure to deliver water and could
43. For a discussion of unresolved issues see DuMars and Ingram, Congressional Quantification
of Indian Reserved Water Rights: A Definitive Solution or a Mirage?, 20 NAT. RES. J. 17-43 (Jan.
1980).
44. Ak-Chin Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act. Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 407,
1982).
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seek compensation equivalent to the replacement value of the water; and
the tribe would waive all other rights and claims to water relating to past,
present or future actions. This agreement was implemented by means of
a contract which defined a phased delivery schedule for the emergency
water supply, beginning with 20,300 acre-feet to be delivered in 1980
and reaching a volume of 85,000 acre-feet by 1986."
A major problem of implementation arose when it was discovered that
the planned source of groundwater on federal lands to be used for the
temporary water supply could not be used without damaging water rights
of the Tohono O'odam Tribe.' In its search for alternative sources, the
Department of the Interior then proposed a controversial step of modifying
Colorado River water delivery contracts it had with cities and irrigation
districts in order to obtain the needed water,47 but those non-Indian entities
threatened lawsuits. 4 The federal government failure to deliver water to
Ak-Chin within four years of the enactment of the 1978 legislation exposed
the government to a damage claim equal to the replacement cost of the
water promised in the phased delivery schedule of the contract.
Eventually, the Department of the Interior re-negotiated the agreement
with Ak-Chin, the state of Arizona and non-Indian water users,49 and
Congress passed new legislation confirming this in 1984.0 Under the
new terms, Ak-Chin accepted a lower quantification in return for cash
benefits and an accelerated water delivery schedule. By January 1, 1988,
the federal government was to deliver 75,000 acre-feet of surface water
suitable to agricultural use. This amount could be reduced to 72,000 acre-
feet in times of shortage or increased by 10,000 acre-feet if the water
were available.
To make the delivery possible, another agreement was negotiated with
non-Indian irrigation districts by which they made available water for
Ak-Chin in return for substantial financial benefits. Three irrigation dis-
45. U.S. Department of the Interior, Contract between the United States and the Ak-Chin Indian
Community to Provide Water and to Settle Claims to Water, 7 (May 20, 1980). Bureau of Indian
Affairs document, published in Environmental Impact Statement, 198 1, for Ak-Chin Water Supply
Project, Department of the Interior.
46. Comments of the Papago Indian Tribe and the Sif Oidak District of the Papago Tribe in the
Environmental Impact Statement on the Ak-Chin Water Supply Project (Apr. 29, 1981) (unpublished
testimony submitted at hearing Apr. 29, 198 1, on Draft Environmental Impact Statement, for Ak-
Chin Water Supply Project).
47. See memorandum from Assistant Solicitor, Branch of Water and Power Div. of Indian Affairs
to Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs & Associate Solicitor, Energy and Resources (Jan. 30, 1984).
48. See letter from Frederick J. Martone to William Horn, Deputy Under Secretary of the Interior,
quoted on behalf of the City of Yuma (Mar. 19, 1984).
49. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, WATER RIGHTS OF THE AK-CHIN INDIAN
COMMUNITY, H.R. REP. No. 1026, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984).
50. Ak-Chin Community Water Rights, Pub. L. No. 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698 (1984), an act relating
to the water rights of the Ak-Chin Indian Community.
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tricts of the Yuma Mesa Division of the Gila Project on the mainstem of
the Colorado River agreed to reduce their entitlements by 50,000 acre-
feet. This water is not part of the Central Arizona Project (CAP), though
it would be delivered to the Ak-Chin area by CAP facilities. The remainder
of the water for Ak-Chin would come from the community's allocation
from waters of the Central Arizona Project. The difference between the
two sources is that CAP water is subordinated in times of shortage to
California's entitlement from the Colorado River. The water transferred
from the irrigation districts is thus a more secure supply.
The new legislation specifies that the water can be used for any use
on or off the reservation but only within a groundwater management area
defined under state law. The Secretary must also establish a water man-
agement plan for the Ak-Chin reservation which is to have the same effect
as any plan developed under state law. As noted below with regard to
the Tohono O'odam settlement, this provision meets an important concern
of the state about regulatory consistency in managing water basins that
include both state and Indian lands. This concern grew out of Arizona's
enactment of a comprehensive groundwater management statute in 1980,
two years after the original Ak-Chin settlement, which requires the state
to develop management plans and to impose conservation requirements
to meet the goal of balancing groundwater withdrawals and recharge by
the year 2025."
Tohono O'odam Tribe
The Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982 resolved
water rights claims of the Tohono O'odam (formerly known as Papago)
in the Tucson region. There are many parallels between the Ak-Chin and
Tohono O'odam agreements. Like Ak-Chin, the Tohono O'odam people
found their lands drying up because of non-Indian groundwater pumping,
and the tribe eventually negotiated an agreement that provided for federal
construction of a water delivery system.
The Tohono O'odam Tribe occupies three reservations: the Sells Res-
ervation, by far the largest in area, which lies to the west of Tucson and
part of which falls within the Tucson basin; the Gila Bend Reservation
to the north on the mainstem of the Gila River; and the San Xavier
Reservation just south of Tucson on the Santa Cruz River. The settlement
refers principally to the San Xavier Reservation and the Shuk Toak District
of the Sells Reservation. It does not address other potential water enti-
tlements of the Tohono O'odam Tribe.
The Tohono O'odam Tribe established its power in the water affairs of
51. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§45-401 to 637 (Supp. 1984-85).
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the Tucson area by filing, in conjunction with the United States, a lawsuit
making extensive claims to groundwater in the Tucson aquifer.52 Water
is so scarce in this region that any substantial new claims to groundwater
would have created pressures on Tucson's ability to sustain urban growth
as well as the access to water of local irrigation districts and mines.53
The first step toward Indian/non-Indian cooperation on water came
with the creation of a study committee in which the major parties were
represented. The study process evolved into a negotiation in which the
attorney representing the Tohono O'odam Tribe and Congressman Morris
Udall and his staff played crucial roles. Successive drafts of proposed
settlement legislation were passed among the parties until all agreed on
a text. This was then passed by Congress but vetoed by President Reagan.
Reagan's principal problems with the bill were the lack of a local cost
sharing formula and what was considered to be excessive liability of the
federal government. Further negotiations with the Department of Interior
established the level of funding that had to be provided by state and local
parties and also changed the liability formula. The need for this second
round of negotiations indicated the limited participation of federal rep-
resentatives in the earlier drafting process.
The final bill, known as the Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement
Act,54 quantified the water that would be made available to the portion
of the Tohono O'odam Reservation within the Tucson water basin, iden-
tified sources of that water (as the original Ak-Chin bill had not fully
done), required the Department of Interior to develop a water use and
conservation plan that contained provisions equivalent to those under
state law, created mechanisms for funding the water delivery system and
providing other benefits to the tribe and permitted off-reservation leasing
of the water by the tribe. Implementation is now underway for this agree-
ment. Local cost sharing contributions have been provided, and contracts
implementing several parts of the agreement are being negotiated.
The three sources of water for the agreement are: Colorado River water
delivered by means of the Central Arizona Project carriage facilities to
two different sections of the reservation (27,000 acre-feet per year to the
San Xavier Reservation and 10,800 acre-feet per year to the Shuk Toak
district of the Sells Reservation), 10,000 acre-feet of groundwater per
year pumped from beneath the San Xavier Reservation, and 23,000 acre-
feet per year of water suitable for agricultural use for San Xavier and
5,200 acre-feet of water per year for agricultural use to Shuk Toak. The
52. Tribal and federal suits filed in 1975 were consolidated in United States and Papago Indian
Tribe v. City of Tucson, No. CIV 75-39 (D. Ariz. 1980).
53. For background and interpretation of the Papago settlement see F. L. BROWN & H. INGRAM,
see supra note 3, at 104-77.
54. Pub. L. No. 97-293, §315, 96 Stat. 1261 (1982).
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latter 28,200 acre-feet is to be obtained from reclaimed water delivered
to the Secretary of the Interior. The Act contemplates that the Secretary
would exchange this water, which would be physically difficult to convey
to Tohono O'odam lands, for other water from specific sources: contracted
but unused water from the Central Arizona Project, water available through
the CAP as a result of augmentation made possible by subsequent acts
of Congress, water obtained with private lands that have irrigation rights
appurtenant to them under state law, or reclaimed water.5
If water is unavailable from these sources to meet the Secretarial obli-
gation to deliver water to the Tohono O'odam, then the federal government
becomes liable for damages. These are equal to replacement costs of
water where a delivery system has not yet been constructed or to the
value of the water if a delivery system is in place, but there is an annual
ceiling on the amount that can be paid by the federal government. This
equals the amount available from a Cooperative Fund established by the
Act with contributions from the federal, state and city governments and
by major mining agricultural companies using water in the Tucson basin.
The Act permits the Tohono O'odam to use water for any purpose and
to lease it for off-reservation use. There are provisions which indicate
that the settlement does not establish legal precedent about the applica-
bility of the Winters Doctrine to groundwater or about the off-reservation
use or leasing of reserved water rights.
In return for the federal obligation to deliver water, to pay for delivery
systems, to establish an economic development trust fund and other bene-
fits of the act, the Tohono O'odam Tribe is required to waive all further
present and future claims to water within the Tucson area as well as to
seek dismissal of the lawsuit filed in 1974. These provisions, of course,
satisfy the basic concerns of the non-Indian community and governments
that the Indian water right in this basin be finally quantified. The state
was also concerned about consistency in water management on and off-
reservation locations. Under the state's Groundwater Management Act,56
the Tucson region was designated as the Tucson Active Management Area
and subjected to the development of state water management plans designed
to regulate the use of all water sources to achieve a balance of groundwater
withdrawals with natural recharge. The state management plans are expected
to impose progressively more rigorous conservation requirements as time
goes on, yet if there were no comparable regulation of water on Indian
lands the state objective might be difficult to achieve.
The legislation refers to this problem in a provision requiring the Sec-
55. See H.R. CONF, REP. No. 855, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 37, 44-46 (1982) (regarding sections
305 and 307 of the Act).
56. See supra note 51.
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retary of the Interior to establish a water management plan for the affected
Tohono O'odam lands "which, except as is necessary to be consistent
with the provisions of this title, will have the same effect as any man-
agement plan developed under Arizona law." This clause has already
been subject to differing interpretations but was not intended to subject
the tribe to state jurisdiction or to reduce the amounts of water the tribe
can use.
57
The Act does not contain any dispute resolution mechanism for future
use and is intended to be implemented by a series of contracts between
the Secretary of the Interior, the tribe, the City of Tucson, and various
private parties.5"
Fort Peck Tribes
To date, the most comprehensive settlement of water rights is the
agreement achieved in Montana by the state and the Assiniboine and
Sioux tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation. The motivation for concluding
a compact was complex and related to several factors: water rights liti-
gation, the potential for an interstate allocation of waters of the Missouri
Basin, and Montana's interest in water marketing proposals. All these
factors suggested that quantification of the tribal water right was in the
best interest of the state.59
The United States began a program of litigating Indian water rights
for all Montana tribes in 1975 and filed two lawsuits' in 1979 on behalf
of the Fort Peck tribes in federal court. Fort Peck is located in the
northeastern part of the state adjacent to the mainstem of the Missouri
River; the reservation is also crossed by several tributaries of the Missouri.
Congressional hearings held in 1979 recorded widespread non-Indian
concern about the impact of this litigation program.6" In that same year,
Montana created its own comprehensive adjudication program, including
creation of a compact commission to negotiate with Indian tribes and
federal agencies, and attempted to have the forum for adjudication changed
to state court.62
57. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 855, supra note 55, at 42.
58. For an interesting discussion of the Papago ability to use the water for economic development,
see Laney, Transferability Under the Papago Water Rights Settlement, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 421-43
(1984).
59. See WRIGHT WATER ENGINEERS & F. TRELEASE, A WATER STRATEGY FOR MONTANA, at ch. 5
(Montana Department of Natural Resources 1982) [hereinafter STRATEGY], & MONTANA LEGIS-
LATURE, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMrrTEE ON WATER MARKETING, at ch. IV (Jan. 1985), [hereinafter
WATER MARKETING].
60. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue River Water Users (D. Mont. 1979) 484 F. Supp. 31 (D.
Mont. 1979), rev'd, 668 F,2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd 463 US. 545 (1983).
61. SENATE SELEcr COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA (1979).
62. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-211 to 243, § 2-15-212 (1983).
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Although the litigation effort was important in motivating Montana to
settle Indian water claims, there were other factors contributing to the
state's interest in negotiation. There is abundant stored water in the portion
of the Missouri basin where Fort Peck is located, but the states of the
basin have been preparing themselves for a major interstate allocation of
Missouri waters for some time. Montana published a study in 1982 which
outlined a number of possible approaches the state could follow in seeking
to protect its claims to waters of the Missouri Basin. Regarding the
relevance of Indian water rights to a possible interstate allocation in this
basin, the report said:
The State of Montana has legitimate and necessary objectives in
negotiating and quantifying Indian and federal reserved rights which
objectives are a part of the strategies for an interstate water allocation.
Among them is the fact that, when incorporated in the statewide
adjudication, a substantial portion of Montana's existing rights will
have been identified and quantified. It is important to note that the
negotiations for the reserved rights compacts should recognize that
the amounts of water allocated to the Indian tribes and federal agen-
cies may be a part of the share allocated to the state in any future
interstate water allocation process. In addition, reserved water rights
allocations within the state should represent quantities which can be
reasonably and practicably put to use in the future. This is important
for two reasons. First, a general standard of reasonableness and
practicability will probably be used in any interstate allocation pro-
ceeding or negotiations to identify potential future uses.. . . Second,
should there be an interstate allocation, the state will want to be able
to put its full allocation to beneficial use at some time in the future
to maximize the economic and social benefit from such an allocation.
Therefore, to maximize the benefit to the state as a whole from the
reserved rights compacts, it may be prudent in the future under certain
circumstances to allow such reserved rights allocations to be used
off a reservation.63
There have been major changes in Montana water law in recent years
and a generally enhanced effort by the state to identify its potential water
claims and position itself to profit from potential interstate water markets.
The state legislature created a Select Committee on Water Marketing
which presented a lengthy report to the legislature at the beginning of its
49th session early in 1985. This study reviewed the relevance of Indian
water claims to the state's hopes for water marketing and concluded that
"uncertainty as to federal and Indian water rights interferes with the
evaluation of water marketing proposals. Generally, these outstanding
63. STRATEGY, supra note 59, at vi-10, 11.
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claims make more difficult the determination of whether the state has
surplus waters for sale and where they might be located. Specifically,
Indian tribes themselves may become sellers and lessors of water-4hereby
competing with the state in the regional water market. .. Everyone will
gain by a conclusion of conflict over the issue.""
These general factors have been important in creating a positive climate
for the state's response to efforts to negotiate Indian water rights. Unlike
the situation in Arizona, there exists a large supply of unused and unal-
located water in the Fort Peck Reservoir on the mainstem of the Missouri
River near the Fort Peck Reservation. Although subject to competing
claims from other states, the supply presented an opportunity for poten-
tially satisfying the tribes' needs without requiring other existing water
users to lose their access to water.
The state created the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Com-
mission in 1979 as part of its adjudication program. The Commission
was primarily a creation of the legislature, and its membership emphasized
persons with influence that would be useful in securing legislative approval
of any negotiated compacts. The commission was authorized to negotiate
with all tribes and federal agencies and imposed a deadline for the ini-
tiation of talks which related to the onset of the adjudication process in
state courts. The Fort Peck tribes were among the first to express interest
in beginning negotiations and actually agreed to a compact with the
commission by late 1982, in time to be submitted for approval to the
Montana legislative session in 1983.65
Even though the commission had approved this compact and was pre-
pared to submit it for ratification, other agencies of state government
expressed reservations about several sections of the agreement. These
agencies also felt that the state would be in a stronger negotiating position
if it waited for the Supreme Court to issue an opinion in the Adsit case
regarding state jurisdiction over the adjudication process.' (Later in the
year, the Supreme Court's decision in this case recognized the jurisdiction
of the state to adjudicate Indian water rights. This court held that state
enabling act provisions purporting to waive jurisdiction over Indian lands
did not prevent the assertion of concurrent state jurisdiction over federal
and Indian water rights under the McCarran Amendment of 1952.)67
Ultimately, the state chose not to submit the proposal to its 1983
legislative session and indicated its desire to re-negotiate some elements,
64. WATER MARKETING, supra note 59, at iv-18, 19.
65. See supra note 19.
66. Id. at 20.
67. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, No. 81-2147, Montana v. Northern
Cheyenne Tribe, 463 U.S. 874 (1983).
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but the tribes refused to consider changes. Negotiations were suspended
for over a year during which time the continued existence of the com-
mission was debated." Eventually the state and the tribes worked out an
agreement that allowed negotiations to resume in the fall of 1984. From
that point, agreement was reached within six months on a new compact,
and the legislature approved it during the 1985 legislative session.69
The Fort Peck-Montana compact quantifies the maximum diversion
and consumptive use permitted the tribe. The tribe may divert the lesser
of 1,050,472 acre-feet or enough water to supply consumptive use of
525,236 acre-feet (Article III). The principal source of this water is to
be the mainstem of the Missouri, and maximum diversions are specified
for different seasons of the year. Most Indian uses on tributaries of the
Missouri within the reservation are subordinated to existing non-Indian
beneficial uses under state law and to federal rights for a wildlife refuge.
Some non-Indian uses, especially those based on water rights obtained
from Indian allottees, are counted against the tribal allocation, but these
are to be quantified by the tribes and not by the state court adjudication.
The tribe has authority under the agreement to establish instream flows
for fish and wildlife on the Missouri tributaries, and these are also counted
as consumptive uses under the Indian right.
Regarding jurisdiction, the compact recognizes the tribe's administra-
tion of its water right within the reservation and requires that this be done
in accordance with a code approved by the Secretary of the Interior
(Article V B (I) and (2)). The state has jurisdiction over all rights, which
arise under state law, whether on or off the reservation which are not part
of the tribal water right (Article V C (1)).
Water can be used for any purpose on the reservation, but uses of the
tribal water right off the reservation must conform to state law of beneficial
use. Any export of tribal water outside the state must be in compliance
with all valid state laws limiting export of water outside the state. (Article
III G) The tribe must give notice to the state of diversions and uses outside
the reservation and prove that they meet a number of conditions, including
a showing that they will not affect any state appropriative right that has
not been abandoned (Article III K).
The tribes can lease water off the reservation but only to a limit that
is tied to the state's legislative authority to market water. The tribe must
allow the state an equal partnership in off-reservation water marketing
opportunities, and the state must do the same for the tribe. These pro-
visions reflect the importance of water marketing to the state. Montana
68. Thorson, supra note 19, at 20-12.
69. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-201 (1987).
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enacted in the same legislative session which approved this compact, a
comprehensive new bill on marketing and other aspects of water law.70
The compact makes no provision for funding of tribal projects or for
construction of water delivery facilities. It does create a compact board
of three persons to resolve conflicts relating to ground and surface water
in the future. One member is selected by the tribes, one by the Governor
and the third by the first two members (Article VI). State courts and
agencies will have no role in resolving disputes.
The compact has been administratively approved by the Department
of the Interior and the Department of Justice and is being made part of
a decree in the state court adjudication. This, in the view of the parties,
makes unnecessary any explicit approval of the compact by Congress.
However, Congress must approve the marketing of Indian water rights.
The state represented the interests of non-Indian water users who have
an opportunity to challenge the agreement in court under the compact
commission statute. It should be noted that downstream states and tribes
in the Missouri Basin were not a part of the negotiating process.
California Mission Bands
The La Jolla, Rincon, San Pasqual, Pauma and Pala Bands of Mission
Indians in San Diego County, California, have recently negotiated an
agreement with the City of Escondido, the Vista Irrigation District and
the Escondido Mutual Water Company regarding water rights. This nego-
tiated settlement is embodied in a legislative proposal that failed passage
in the 99th Congress but has been reintroduced in the 100th. The five
bands filed three separate lawsuits challenging different aspects of agree-
ments consented to by the Secretary of the Interior in the early part of
this century which permitted non-Indian use of San Luis Rey River waters
claimed by the Indians. In one action the bands sued in the Court of
Claims for compensation relating to the federal failure to protect water
rights.7 In another case, the five bands sought invalidation of the contracts
between Interior and the non-Indian water agencies.72 The third case
related to renewal of a hydropower license issued in 1924 to the non-
Indian entities.
The Indians have had success in the litigation effort, but have been
negotiating for several years. An earlier agreement was reached in 1979,
but proposed legislation to implement that settlement lost the support of
70, 1985 Mont. Laws 573 (codified at various sections of MoNr. CODE ANN, arts. 75, 85 (1987)).
71. Baron Long v. United States, 217 Ct. CI. 668 (1978).
72. Rincon Band of Indians v. Escondido Mutual Water Company Nos. 69-217-S, 72-276-S, 72-
271-S (S.D. Cal. t979).
73. Escondido Mutual Water Company v. La Jolla, Rincon, San Pasqual, Pauma and Pala Bands
of Mission Indians, 468 U.S. 1267 (1985).
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the City of Escondido and the Escondido Mutual Water Company.74 By
the end of 1985, a completely different agreement was reached, and that
is the subject of the new proposed legislation. An unusual feature of this
situation is that the five bands have formed a single entity to receive and
manage waters for them. This is the San Luis Rey Indian Water Authority.
The new agreement was introduced in the House of Representatives
at the end of 1985. In this version, the bill calls for the annual delivery
by the Secretary of the Interior of 22,700 acre-feet of water from the
Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project to the San Luis Rey Indian
Water Authority. This water is to be proportionately shared in times of
shortage, and the Secretary is under no obligation to build new delivery
facilities. This water is provided in partial fulfillment of the bands' reserved
water rights claims. 75 The Indian Water Authority is empowered to put
water to any beneficial use and may "lease, sell, exchange, control, and
manage" water or power resources on or off the reservation. 76 There is
a provision asserting that no part of the Act can be construed as altering
or affecting the determination of the issue of whether or not reserved
water rights may be used or sold off an Indian reservation.77 The bill also
alludes to an agreement among the parties to the effect that the non-Indian
entities will be obligated to purchase water surplus to Indian needs at a
price that is at least 80 percent of the local entities' cost of obtaining
water from their alternative source. Thus, although the bill does not
provide a federal funding mechanism, it does create a market which can
meet the bands' financial needs. The bill is made contingent on final
resolution of all claims in pending cases and the entering of stipulated
judgments in these cases.7 '
Colorado Ute Tribes
On December 10, 1986, fifteen parties signed a final settlement agree-
ment concerning Colorado Ute Indian water rights. The two tribes involved
in this settlement are the Southern Ute and the Ute Mountain Ute, occu-
pying contiguous reservations in the southwestern part of the state in the
San Juan River basin, part of the Upper Colorado River system. An
adjudication of the water rights of the tribes had been in progress since
1972, 79 but it had been clear to the parties for some time that resolution
74. Settlement of San Luis Rey River Water Claims: Hearings on S. 1507 Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 16 (1980).
75. H.R. 3958, 99th CONG., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1985).
76. Id. at 14-15.
77. Id. at 16-17.
78. Id. at 8-9.
79. In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America in Colorado
Water Division No. 7, State of Colorado, Civ. Nos. W-1603-76 and W-1603-76A-J (filed Apr. 8,
1976). An earlier federal suit was dismissed in favor of adjudication in state court. See infra note
80.
winter 198
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
of the claims could be resolved to the satisfaction of the tribes and the
non-Indian water users through construction of the Animas-La Plata fed-
eral rjeclamation project.'
The adjudication case was fought on procedural grounds for several
years, and a major Supreme Court case8' determined that it would be
tried in state water court. After 1976 very little progress was made on
the litigation, apparently in the expectation that Animas-La Plata would
provide the answer to the problem of competing claims. Without Animas-
La Plata, one estimate of the impact of Indian water claims projected
elimination of non-Indian agriculture in two drainages as well as impacts
to municipal water in two others.8 2
In late 1985, Governor Richard Lamm convened a task force of the
principal parties to attempt a negotiated settlement. The Department of
Natural Resources and the Attorney General took the active roles rep-
resenting the State of Colorado. Seven conservancy districts and canal
companies were represented in addition to the two Indian tribes. Addi-
tionally, the City of Durango, the Town of Pagosa Springs, and a private
developer took part in the negotiations.
The Department of the Interior was initially represented, but the local
parties eventually asked that they be allowed to develop their own agree-
ment which could then be reviewed by Interior. A professional facilitator
was retained to help as a process manager only. The initial deadline for
the negotiations was June 30, 1986, a date specified in a congressional
appropriation relating to Animas-La Plata and regarded by the parties as
crucial for the future funding of the project.
Notably absent from the discussions were the environmental and rec-
reational groups at both the local and national levels which had been
opposing the Animas-La Plata Project for years. A public hearing was
held at one point during the negotiations, and the environmental interests
took part. Apparently, these interests were not regarded as essential to a
negotiated settlement by the other parties.
In April, 1986, an agreement was reached by the local parties and
forwarded to Interior. There ensued a period of re-negotiation as the
Reagan Administration refined cost-sharing and other principles that were
essential to winning its support for substantial federal funding. The June
deadline was met by the parties, but the final drafting process continued
for another six months as disagreement continued over several minor
issues.
The agreement, then, involved securing federal support for a recla-
mation project estimated to cost close to $600 million in a period when
80. Southern Ute TribalCouncil, Letter and Fact Sheet (public letter, Sept. 26, 1983).
81. Colorado River Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
82. DURANGO PROJECTS OFFICE, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANIMAS LA PLATA PRojECr 4 (undated).
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the Congress and the Reagan Administration were both backing away
from the funding of such projects.8 3 The final hurdle for the agreement
is congressional adoption of an act embodying its terms. Legislation was
submitted to Congress in the summer of 1987.
The agreement itself relies completely on Animas-La Plata as well as
on the Dolores Project, the principal features of which had been completed
by the time negotiations began. It quantifies tribal "project reserved
rights," that is reserved rights to water supplied by either Animas-La
Plata or Dolores, in terms of maximum diversions for irrigation and for
municipal and industrial uses. The priority dates for these rights are
recognized as 1868, the treaty dates by which the two reservations were
established, but the rights are subordinated to all rights decreed and senior
to the two projects. Furthermore, they "shall share on a pro rata basis
the priority" of the projects. In other words, Indians and non-Indians will
share all shortages proportionally. The non-project related rights of the
tribes are also quantified and specified as to use, source and parcels of
land where applied.
The state assumes jurisdiction over water deliveries up to the headgates
of the Indian distribution systems and also over all transfers of tribal
rights to new uses. The tribes are permitted to sell water both in-state
and outside the state in keeping with state and federal law, provided
Congress gives its consent through legislation adopting the elements of
the agreement. The federal and state governments also agree to provide
tribal development funds in the amount of $60.5 million, the federal
share, of course, contingent on congressional appropriation.
The agreement is contingent on adoption of the agreement by the
Colorado water court and by the 100th Congress. Revision of the agree-
ment is possible only by joint consent of the parties, and there are several
provisions ensuring the finality of the arrangements."
Ute Tribe
The Ute Tribe found itself in the 1950s and 1960s in a position with
regard to the Central Utah Project somewhat similar to that of the Navajos
regarding the San Juan Chama Diversion Project. Resolution of Ute water
claims in the Duchesne River area of the Uinta Basin was important for
completion of Utah's major transbasin diversion project intended to enable
the state to make use of its share of water under the Upper Colorado
River Compact. 5
83. Shabecoff, After 85 Years, the Era of Big Dams Nears End, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1987.
84. See generally STATE OF COLORADO, COLORADO UTE INDIAN WATER RIGHTS: FINAL SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT (Dec. 10, 1986) (regarding provisions of settlement).
85. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT CENTRAL UTAH
PROJECT BONNEVILLE UNIT 5.17-5.19 (1973) [hereinafter FEIS]; Fetzer, The Ute Indian Water Com-
pact, 2 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 182-86 [hereinafter Fetzer].
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In 1950, negotiations began between the tribe, the Bureau of Recla-
mation and state parties regarding the relationship of Ute water rights
and the Central Utah Project (CUP). An engineering report (the Decker
Report), quantified Ute water rights and organized the tribe's irrigable
acreage into seven land classes.86 In 1961, the Duchesne River Area Study
Committee was formed with representatives of the Ute Tribe, local non-
Indian water users, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Utah Water and
Power Board, the Upper Colorado River Commission and the Bureau of
Reclamation. This committee performed several studies and made a set
of recommendations in 1962 which formed the basis for a negotiated
agreement formalized in 1965."
Known as the Deferral Agreement, the arrangement provided that the
Utes would defer, not abandon, the development of irrigable acreage that
could be served with water from the Duchesne River. The deferral was
to last until 2005 and would facilitate use of water needed for the Bonne-
ville Unit of the Central Utah Project." It was contemplated that the Ute
lands would be served by the Ute Indian Unit of the CUP, the ultimate
phase of the project. The agreement called for projects to mitigate impacts
on fish and wildlife; permitted Indian uses of water for purposes other
than irrigation; and recognized an 1861 priority date for the five major
classes of lands on the reservation, as they had been tabulated in the
Decker Report."9 The Deferral Agreement was also recognized in the
Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968. 90
In the 1970s, however, the tribal council became dissatisfied with this
agreement, especially since the slow pace of funding and construction
for the project made completion of the Indian unit seem remote. There
were several other problems at the time between the state and the tribe,
and the state legislature designated four committees of negotiators to
work simultaneously on the major issue areas. Only the committee dealing
with water was able to develop a tentative agreement. This was the Ute
Indian Water Compact which was ratified by the state in 1980 but which
has not been ratified by either the tribe or by Congress.9"
This compact called for recognition by the state of the Ute right to
deplete 248,943 acre-feet of water per year. The amount of water is
expressed as both a depletion and a gross diversion and is considered a
86. Fetzer, supra note 85,' at 191.
87. FEIS, supra note 85, at 23-24. (Contract 14-06-W-194 among the Bureau of Reclamation,
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Ute Indian Tribe and the Central Utah Water Conservancy District.)
88. Deferral Agreement §§ 3, 5, Dept. of Interior Contract No. 14-06-W-194 (1965).
89. Deferral Agreement §§4, 6, 9, Dept. of Interior Contract No. 14-06-W-194 (1965).
90. Colorado River Basin Project Act, Title V, § 501(a), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1501, Pub. L. No. 90-
537; 82 Stat. 885.
91. Ute Indian Water Compact, UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-21-2 (1980).
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part of the Utah share of the Colorado River. The compact spells out
exactly how much water can be taken at each diversion point and provides
that the state would have jurisdiction over delivery of water up to the
point of intake into the Indian facilities. The tribe and the U.S. would
have jurisdiction after that point. The agreement also indicates the use
of water at each diversion point and requires the Indians to go through
the state transfer and change of use process for any changes in those
purposes, unless the changes are confined to the same canal system. There
is no provision in the agreement for funds for the tribe or for construction
of any facilities for Indian use.
The state legislature ratified this agreement in 1980, but the Ute tribal
referendum was inconclusive. The turnout for the vote was less than that
needed for a valid referendum, and a new referendum has not been
scheduled. Further negotiations have been held from time to time but
have not as yet resulted in a new or revised agreement. The Deferral
Agreement of 1965 remains in effect.
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
The Pyramid Lake Paiute Reservation surrounds Pyramid Lake, which
is the terminal point of the Truckee River system. The Truckee rises in
California's Sierra Nevada mountains and flows from Lake Tahoe to
Pyramid Lake. After 1915 when water was provided to the Newlands
Reclamation Project, the level of the lake declined as water users increased
withdrawals from the system. The tribe has attempted by several means
to maintain the level of the lake for protection of fisheries and for religious
and cultural purposes. The tribe initiated a series of lawsuits litigating
almost every aspect of the problem. In the early 1 970s they successfully
sued the Department of the Interior regarding the water management
policies governing releases of water from upstream reservoirs. This case
established the principle that the Secretary had to give priority to Indian
needs in establishing procedures for water delivery.92
The litigation as a whole revolves around a series of sometimes con-
flicting responsibilities that have been imposed on the Secretary of the
Interior by the Congress. The Secretary of the Interior must manage the
system's reservoirs not only to protect Indian rights but also to ensure
that two endangered species of fish in Pyramid Lake are not harmed. The
Secretary, however, also has responsibilities to provide water under con-
tract to fulfill the congressional purposes of several reclamation acts to
deliver water for agricultural, municipal and industrial needs. Much of
92. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F Supp. 252 (D.D.C.).
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the litigation alleges the failure of the Secretary to meet one or another
of these obligations.
Some aspects of the water rights litigation were resolved by a 1983
decision of the Supreme Court.93 In that case, the Court refused a tribal
effort to relitigate elements of a 1944 decree" under which the tribe
received limited rights for irrigation but none for fisheries protection.
Nevertheless, the tribe has had success with other lawsuits. One of these
attempted to address the impact on Pyramid Lake of increased water
usage in Reno and Sparks, the major cities upstream of the lake, as well
as water pollution coming from the sewage treatment plant operated
jointly by the two cities.
The latter suit,95 brought against the cities and EPA, was settled through
negotiation. The agreement, entered as a stipulated decree in the lawsuit,
committed the cities to a series of water conservation measures and improved
water pollution monitoring. While this did not provide a new water supply
for the tribe, it achieved the tribal goal of committing a major water user
in the Truckee system to a new level of conservation to mitigate the
impacts of urban growth on the fisheries habitat.
More recently, the tribal council and the numerous other parties involved
in this case have attempted to negotiate an agreement that goes to the
heart of the water rights problem. Negotiations were originally convened
by the Bureau of Reclamation in 1981. An agreement was reached in
1985 and incorporated into proposed congressional legislation." This was
a complex document that included the text of the California-Nevada
Interstate Compact as well as the Pyramid Lake agreement.There were
congressional hearings on the bill, but the Pyramid Lake Paiute Com-
munity disapproved the agreement in a referendum while authorizing
continued negotiations.97 An effort to secure congressional ratification of
the California-Nevada Compact without the tribal agreement failed in the
last session of the 99th Congress in 1986. The Department of the Interior
attempted to revive talks early in 1987 and analyzed a number of options
for enhancing water supplies, but thus far the parties have not resumed
direct negotiations.
COMMON PROBLEMS AND ELEMENTS
The eleven agreements and proposed agreements discussed in the pre-
93. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
94. United States v. Orr Ditch Water Company, No. A-3 (D. Nev. 1944).
95. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Reno, No. CV.LV 82-389 (D. Nev. 1983).
96. S. 1558, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
97. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, Statement of Principles, Objectives and Goals of the Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe Concerning Settlement Negotiation, Involving Pyramid Lake and Truckee River
Water and Fishing Matters (unpublished and undated statement).
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ceding section fall into two general categories. The first category encom-
passes agreements, in whatever form, that give final resolution to water
rights and at least limited jurisdictional issues. The Fort Peck and proposed
Utah Ute agreements are inter-governmental compacts addressing broad
issues of jurisdiction as well as quantifying and specifying the sources
and uses of the entire tribal water right. Intended to be equally final, if
different in form, are the Colorado Ute agreement, the Ak-Chin agree-
ments and legislation, the Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act
and the agreement and proposed legislation relating to the five bands of
Mission Indians in southern California. The two Navajo agreements, the
Ute Deferral Agreement and the Pyramid Lake-Reno-Sparks settlement,
comprise a second category designed to achieve much more limited goals
in relation to specific water use problems.9"
Relevant to both types of agreements are several elements and problems
which are discussed below. First is the problem of defining goals; second
is the impact of incentives to negotiate; third is a set of issues concerning
representation and accountability; fourth is the way in which the federal
role is handled; fifth is the importance of the distribution of water benefits;
and sixth is the problem of management of the process.
Goals
One of the critical elements necessary for success in a negotiation
process is that each party have clear goals that can be achieved through
negotiation. If a tribe's or a state's goal is to establish a new legal principle
relating to the Winters Doctrine, litigation is the process that should be
used because it is capable of providing a binding legal precedent. If the
goals, however, are to achieve specific practical solutions to problems of
how to share and administer water sources, then negotiation may be a
possible strategy, provided the parties are willing to engage in good faith
bargaining. Each of the situations cited above involved goals that were
perceived by the parties as related to needs that had to be satisfied in the
near term, for example, construction of major water projects, elimination
of legal uncertainty to facilitate water marketing, minimizing the trans-
actional costs of defining water rights.
If goals are not clearly established by the parties or if there is serious
disagreement on one side about what the goals are, then negotiation may
fail for the simple reason that the party without clear goals may never
know when it has achieved all it needs. Without a specific goal in mind,
there is no standard by which to evaluate proposed agreements. Nego-
tiators may agree to terms that are repudiated by their constituents, or
one party may give away too much, or it may never achieve internal
98. For a similar classification, see L. Burton, supra note 1, at 126-30.
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consensus about the desirability of accepting or rejecting the other side's
proposals. This can lead to frustration and alienation of the other parties
and expose one's own side to possible misjudgment about what is in its
best interest.
Incentives, Conditions and Deadlines for Negotiation
Because the value of property interests in water is so high, parties are
often reluctant to make binding decisions voluntarily unless pressures and
conditions are such as to require that decisions be made within a limited
time frame. There must be incentives for the parties to bargain, that is,
the prospect of specific gains, conditions conducive to satisfying the needs
of the parties (such as the availability of adequate water supplies) and
realistic deadlines which, if not met, will result in clearly understood
penalties." Such factors comprise generally those conditions which enter
into the parties' strategic calculation of the costs and benefits of pursuing
a negotiation process.
Deadlines are perhaps the most important factor in producing final
agreement. A deadline is a point in time after which the potential costs
and benefits to the parties will change markedly. The onset of adjudication
in state court, the termination date of a congressional session and the
time pressure for concluding a business arrangement have served as effec-
tive limits on some of the negotiation processes cited above. It provides
the opportunity and the pressure for the parties either to conclude an
agreement or risk foregoing benefits and increasing costs. "0 Commonly,
agreements are reached in the final hours or moments before expiration
of a deadline. Without a deadline that is regarded as valid by all parties
(that is, one that cannot be changed without imposing significant costs
on the parties), negotiations can be prolonged indefinitely and ultimately
may yield no conclusion.
While incentives, conditions and deadlines are crucial to the success
of a negotiation process, one cannot define a set of factors that will serve
this function in every case. The specific factors will vary depending on
the goals, perceptions and interests of the parties. For example, litigation
was a strong incentive for negotiation in the Tohono O'odam case but
was not a factor in the Navajo negotiations.
Representation and Accountability
One of the most important decisions about a negotiation process is the
determination of which parties must be included and how they will be
represented. As noted above, parties are generally defined as those with
99. Cornick, supra note 26, at 28-29.
100. Hater, supra note 33, at 47-48.
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both an interest in the outcome of the case and some level of power to
influence that outcome. Once all parties have been identified, there is a
range of methods for representing their interests in negotiations. Each
party may insist on having a negotiating team at the table, some may
form coalitions to bargain through a single team, others may be satisfied
simply to be kept informed of the progress of talks.
Closely related to the issue of representation is accountability of nego-
tiators to their constituents. The Fort Peck, Ute and Pyramid Lake agree-
ments encountered problems because negotiators for one side were
contradicted by their constituents, superiors or ratifying agencies. It is
essential that each party disclose the nature of its internal decisionmaking
process in so far as this affects the ability of negotiators to make com-
mitments. And each party must be certain that negotiators have specific
instructions on what decisions they can make. Nothing is more destructive
of trust at the negotiation table than revealing that the real power to make
decisions is remote from the scene of discussions.
The Federal Role
Although most of the disputes that have given rise to the agreements
described in this article have their origins in competition for water at the
state, tribal and local level, the federal government has a crucial role for
three major reasons. As pointed out earlier, the United States is owner
of the ultimate fee under American law of waters reserved for Indian use,
and its consent is required to agreements with state and private entities
about the disposition of these property rights. Second, the United States
has played an important role, principally through construction of water
projects, in creating the conditions that made competition between Indian
and non-Indian water users possible. It is often looked upon as having a
responsibility for facilitating settlement and limiting costs imposed on
local parties."°' Third, the federal government has the ability to pay for
solutions to water problems and often the necessary legal authority for
implementing agreements.
Where the federal government is expected to meet the costs of settle-
ment, in whole or part, or where new authority is needed for a federal
official to implement the settlement, congressional legislation is usually
the vehicle for achieving federal consent. While Congress often defers
to legislative proposals of local concern that are supported by a state's
full congressional delegation, there are cases where congressional scrutiny
of a proposed settlement can introduce many new factors and uncertain-
ties. Settlements that cost a great deal or that are looked upon as dangerous
precedents for other states or that may directly affect other areas of the
101. RESERVED WATER RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 9, 167, 211.
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country that were not represented in the negotiation process may be
subjected to a new and searching review. This, of course, is the proper
function of Congress, to represent fully all possible national interests that
may be at stake in a proposed bill. Parties whose agreements are likely
to face congressional review have generally anticipated and taken into
account within the negotiation process the concerns of other states and
national constituencies. Without such consideration, congressional approval
may be thrown into question.
Some agreements have had only federal administrative consent. The
Fort Peck Compact was approved by the Interior and Justice Departments
but not submitted to Congress. Instead it is being made part of water
court decrees in the Montana adjudication process. Certain elements of
the agreement, in particular the marketing of water rights by the tribes,
must be authorized by Congress, but legislation has not yet been sub-
mitted. The Pyramid Lake-Reno Sparks Agreement was approved by
EPA, a party to the lawsuit, and took effect as a stipulated federal court
decree. The Ute Deferral Agreement was signed by federal agencies and
took effect in the form of a contract among the parties. The Navajo Power
Plant Agreement was adopted through both a tribal council resolution and
a contract with a federal agency.'°2
The variety in the types of agreements, the circumstances that give
rise to them and the specific legal requirements of each case have pre-
cluded thus far a uniform approach to federal approval. But federal approval
is necessary, and the way in which it is obtained is extremely important
to the ultimate feasibility and success of most agreements.
Distribution of Water Benefits
Driving most of the negotiated agreements reviewed here is a specific
goal to put water to use, whether by Indians or non-Indians, or to protect
existing uses or to preserve the ability to use water for specific future
purposes. There is an important reason underlying this link between these
cases and water use. Were the parties only attempting to define water
rights in the abstract, they might well find little reason to negotiate. If
the various sides have to divide a limited right to water which is already
fully appropriated under state law, one side will gain at the expense of
the others. It is a win-lose situation.
There must be some prospect that the benefits of resource use can be
shared in such a way that all parties will achieve basic objectives. 3 This
102. See Back and Taylor, supra note 40, at 87-88 (discussion of effect of tribal council resolution
lacking approval by Secretary of the Interior).
103. See Mann, The Politics of Water Resource Development in The Upper Colorado River Basin,
Lake Powell Research Project 27-28 (Sept. 1974) (characterization of water politics with respect to
distribution of benefits).
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does not imply that there must be an abundant supply of unallocated
water, as there was in the case of the Fort Peck Tribes and Montana.
Arizona has had two major settlements despite the fact that it has a water
deficit problem and that part of the supply promised to the Indians had
to be obtained through a re-allocation or exchange. The parties must be
able to perceive an allocation of benefits that is mutually satisfactory and
be flexible about the form in which the benefits are realized. For some
tribes, water delivery will be more important than water rights. For some
states, participation in off-reservation water decisions by Indians is more
important than the level of quantification of Indian rights. Non-Indian
water users may be willing to trade some of their rights for financial
benefits. However the variables are balanced, there must be a sufficient
number of factors relating to water rights and water use to permit the
simultaneous resolution of the problems faced by all the parties."°4
Assistance for the Negotiation Process
Because the stakes in water negotiations are so high, it is often difficult
for the parties to initiate and sustain the negotiation entirely on their own.
There is often one party who is able to play the role of facilitator to
initiate the process and to help keep it going when an impasse is reached.
In Indian water cases, this role has been played by members of Congress,
by a governor and by other elected officials. This section will examine
the reasons for this assistance and examine the possibility of meeting this
need through use of professional facilitators as well as influential parties.
Most negotiation processes are helped at various stages by someone
whose judgment, influence and neutral interest in a fair settlement is
respected by all the parties. Such a person can facilitate organization of
the process and maintain and restore communication when problems arise."
In the Indian cases reviewed in this article, Congressman Morris Udall
played this role in relation to the Tohono O'odam case, though his impor-
tance went far beyond that of a facilitator. Congressman Barnes and his
staff played a comparable role in resolving the California Mission Bands'
water claims. Governor Lamm of Colorado convened the initial meetings
that led to negotiation of the Ute tribal water adjudication. Members of
Congress have played important roles in most of the cases that have
resulted in federal legislation. In the other cases there was either no
mediator or the role was played sporadically by persons closely related
to the parties. The assistance of a dispute resolution professional has been
used in only one case of this type, although professional mediation has
104. See J. SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA 113-44 (1984) (regarding negotiating
to take advantage of different and multiple needs and concerns of parties.)
105. H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 218-19 (1982).
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been employed widely in other types of natural resource and environ-
mental disputes around the country."
Most parties considering negotiation readily see the value of a respected
"third" party in convening a group to initiate discussions. At this stage,
Indians and non-Indians may have been in litigation for many years and
may find it difficult to initiate the process on their own. Their constituents
might see an offer to negotiate as a backing away from earlier commit-
ments; or relations among the parties may simply be so hostile as to
prevent any of them from opening discussions without the aid of another
person or institution not directly connected to the conflict. There is another
point at which most negotiators involved in Indian water cases recognize
the need for outside assistance. That arises in dealing with an impasse
in bargaining, a breakdown of communication or outright hostility among
the parties. A third-party can again work with the negotiating teams, help
correct misunderstandings, remind all of the positive benefits that could
come from the process or the costs of failure and perhaps convene further
sessions to explore new options.
Apart from these well known points where the need for outside inter-
vention is commonly recognized, there are other functions relating to the
negotiation process that can sometimes be performed most efficiently by
someone who does not have a direct interest in how the substantive issues
are resolved.
In any negotiation process, ground rules for efficient use of time must
be agreed to by the parties. The rights of participants must be safeguarded
through these ground rules, and guidance on their drafting and imple-
mentation can often be obtained from persons experienced in negotiation
process. Dispassionate facilitation of meetings is important to ensure
productive use of time. Each negotiation process has many purely man-
agerial functions that have to be performed carefully to prevent alienation
and misunderstanding. The logistics of meetings and scheduling, taking
into account the particular needs and resources of each party, must be
handled in a neutral fashion. Circulation of written materials, note-taking
on potential terms of agreement, and maintenance of communication
among the parties between meetings is important. Advice from a disin-
terested source can also be useful in drafting agendas, framing the terms
of discussion and developing ideas about the sequencing of negotiation
tasks.
Most of these aspects of negotiation procedure will be attended to by
someone during any fruitful process. The question is can or should the
106. See generally G. BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DIsPUTs: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE
13-63 (The Conservation Foundation, 1986).
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parties seek outside help to deal with these issues so they can remain
focused on their primary role as negotiators?
In recent years, professional mediation has become an important ele-
ment in the environmental and natural resources field."°0 A mediator is
someone who helps parties reach agreement. Mediators are not empow-
ered by the parties to impose decisions and often they do not make
substantive suggestions about possible settlement. Mediators typically
perform many functions. They are experts in procedure, can identify
potential problems, manage the process for parties who are primarily
concerned about the substance of the negotiations, act as a buffer when
relations are tense, help re-establish communication if discussions become
deadlocked or break off altogether, and dispassionately facilitate meetings
to keep them orderly and productive. They can also carry out an assess-
ment on whether or not negotiation is likely to be fruitful before the
parties formally convene. 8
The functions of a mediator are likely to be carried out in some fashion
even if a mediator is not used. Management of the process of commu-
nication, logistics and organization of a negotiation process must be given
careful attention, in addition to the issues of representation, ground rules,
drafting and review of implementation problems. With or without a dis-
pute resolution professional, a negotiation process requires careful man-
agement and organization to have the best chance of success." Use of
a mediator can help the parties concentrate on the business of negotiating
an agreement by ensuring that the structure of the process itself will not
be a hindrance.
The very fact that a professional mediator has been employed in only
one Indian water case, and then only as a process advisor,"0 suggests
that there is resistance to having these functions carried out by profes-
sionals despite the increasing use of mediators in other types of natural
resource and environmental disputes."' Among possible reasons for this
resistance are a lack of recognition that the role itself requires the assis-
tance of a professional, reluctance to assign a significant role to anyone
not already well-known to the parties and a feeling that someone with
the role of mediator/facilitator/process manager will be taking some degree
of control over the process away from the parties.
Our only conclusion here is that the parties need to examine the full
107. BINGHAM, supra note 106, at 1-4.
108. See generally Colosi, Negotiation in the Public and Private Sectors, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI.
229-53 (1983); D. KOLB, THE MEDIATORS (1985) (discussion of the roles and tactics of mediators).
109. BINGHAM, supra note 106, at 10.
110. Personal communication with John Huyler, mediator at Denver, Colo. (Feb. 12, 1986).
111. BINGHAM, supra note 106, at 28-44.
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range of procedural and communication problems and agree among them-
selves on the best way of handling them. Not to make some provision
for dealing with them is to invite problems at later stages.
EVALUATING NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS
The increasing frequency with which negotiation is being used to resolve
controversies involving Indian water rights suggests that the parties to
such cases are coming to view this alternative as one that can help them
achieve their goals. Whether or not that hope will be realized in practice
remains to be seen as recently ratified settlements are implemented and
as new proposed settlements meet the early tests of congressional scrutiny,
tribal referendum, state legislative votes or judicial review. What mea-
sures or instruments can be used to begin the process of evaluating how
well negotiated settlements are working? This section looks at the ability
of ratification methods to raise long-term issues of fairness.
It is often the case in negotiations, whether involving Indian rights or
other issues, that there is a disparity in the power and resources available
to the various parties.' State and federal agencies generally have more
personnel, funding and information resources than do Indian tribal gov-
ernments. Often Indians are dependent on the federal government for
funding to develop their negotiating positions, and, in the past, tribal
governments have had very limited abilities to obtain information from
sources that were not parties to the negotiations. Price and Weatherford
discussed this problem in relation to the Navajo negotiations about water
for the Navajo Generating Station and the Navajo Indian Irrigation Proj-
ect." 3 Brown and Ingram have reviewed related issues in a study of the
Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act." 4
Disparity in available resources does not necessarily mean that the
parties have not achieved a relative balance of power with respect to the
issue under negotiation. In fact, the reverse is often true. The Tohono
O'odam established power with their lawsuit against Tucson. The Navajos
have had power regarding water that has affected the planning of federal
and state agencies alike. The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and the California
Mission Bands are examples of small tribes that have established an
important position respecting water because of a long and determined
litigation strategy. Clearly, the tribes involved in the negotiation processes
reviewed above were parties that had to be dealt with by more powerful
agencies.
Non-Indian parties can be in this same position. A small irrigation
112. See generally Fisher, Negotiating Power, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 149-66 (1983).
113. See generally Price & Weatherford, supra note 36.
114. See generally F. L. BROWN & H. INGRAM, supra note 53.
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district or individuals who find themselves involved in a complex water
adjudication generally have less ability than tribes to command the atten-
tion of decisionmakers and protect their interests through direct repre-
sentation in a negotiation process. Typically, their solution has been to
band together, employ common legal representation and pressure elected
politicians to facilitate resolution of Indian claims. Often, they are not
represented at the table, as in the Fort Peck negotiations,. but must rely
either on the state to protect their interests or on ratification and appeal
procedures.
To carry out negotiations, these parties must also have funding, lead-
ership, professional expertise and information resources. Perhaps the most
difficult aspect of negotiations for relatively powerless parties is deciding
whether or not they have made the best deal possible.
The evaluation of the ultimate success of any strategy used by a party
to define water rights and access to the benefits of water use takes many
years for three major reasons. First, the value of resources changes over
time, and concessions made in light of present knowledge may turn out
to have been premature if future conditions result in a much higher value
for the resource in question. Second, agreements themselves take a long
time to implement; it is much easier to assess the viability of near-term
implementation than the ultimate wisdom of the underlying agreement
before the long-term effects are well understood.
Third, it is problematic to choose standards for evaluation. Each party
has certain objectives which may apparently be satisfied by an agreement,
but these objectives may be repudiated as short-sighted by succeeding
political administrations or by later generations. The most significant
short-term evaluation process usually occurs in the ratification of agree-
ments by the affected constituents. This provides the opportunity for the
parties themselves to review the terms agreed to by their negotiators and
complete their internal bargaining process. Two major agreements (Ute
and Pyramid Lake) have not passed community ratification tests. Three
(Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act, California Mission Bands
and Fort Peck) had a history of rejection by non-Indian parties before
ultimate success in negotiation.
The existence of a ratification process recognized as legitimate by
constituents is perhaps the most important safeguard that a general dis-
parity in resources and power will not translate into a bad deal for one
of the parties. In the case of Indian parties, there is a further safeguard
found in the law of Indian property. That is the federal role as trustee for
that property, a role which requires the government to act according to
exacting standards for the protection of Indian water rights. "" The Pyr-
1 15. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 220-28 (R. Strickland ed, 1982).
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amid Lake litigation, for example, has shown that the Secretary of the
Interior cannot adopt water management rules for the benefit of a non-
Indian irrigation district that fail to protect Indian interests in water."
6
Litigation can be an effective tool used by tribal governments to ensure
that federal protection of Indian rights is carried out. Of course, these
very protections of Indian interests can raise doubts in the minds of non-
Indian parties about the finality of agreements reached with tribes since
they may be subject to legal challenge as being inconsistent with these
safeguards.
Disparity in the relative power of the parties, then, is common in these
cases but not indicative of an inability of weaker parties to build power
with respect to water issues and to achieve their objectives through nego-
tiation. Evaluating how effectively that power has been used in defining
the benefits or costs of any agreement can be tested in the short run by
internal ratification processes used by each party and in the long run by
monitoring and review of the effects of the agreement over time.
The parties who have least access to resources and who have played
little or no role in negotiations of Indian water issues are the individual
water users, both Indian and non-Indian. They are typically represented
in negotiations by their governments. Non-Indian individual water users
have been protected in agreements thus far to the extent that they have
not had to reduce their use of water or their water rights. Individual Indian
water users may or may not be fully protected. The recourse of individuals
in both cases is generally through the court systems of their own juris-
dictions. At this early stage in implementing the agreements thus far
negotiated, it is not yet possible to determine if individual rights have
been adequately protected.
The existence of a legitimate ratification process and the definition of
clear goals and strategy are important procedural safeguards by which
parties with relatively less power and resources test the effectiveness of
negotiated agreements. The rights of dissident elements within each party
are protected principally through their ability to litigate and contest the
legality of an agreement. While it is possible for more powerful parties
to coerce or control information to the extent that agreements unfavorable
to weaker parties can be accepted by negotiators, they expose themselves
to the risk that the effort to reach agreement will be set back by the
rejection of a proposal through the ratification process or subsequent
litigation if it is perceived as unfair by those to whom the negotiators are
accountable.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult, and perhaps counter-productive, to attempt to generate
116. See supra note 78.
[Vol. 28
Winter 1988] NEGOTIATED INDIAN WATER DISPUTES 103
a model of the ideal water rights agreement since the specific issues,
needs and interests of the parties will determine what can and should be
resolved through negotiation in each case. The agreement of the parties
may also be modified by the political realities and constraints imposed
by the process of legislative ratification.
Negotiation is one of many strategies by which parties attempt to create
greater certainty about the allocation of resources. The likelihood of its
success depends upon whether or not the parties have accurately assessed
their own needs, the political context, and their ability and willingness
to work jointly with other parties to secure mutual gains. Its principal
virtue is very likely its flexibility in responding to the real goals of the
parties. The success of negotiated agreements in resolving conflict about
Indian water rights cannot be evaluated fully for many years, but the
increasing use of this approach suggests the need for practical and inno-
vative mechanisms to facilitate stable and equitable decisions about water
allocation.
